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I consider the problem of the design of an optimal self-selecting contract scheme for a principal who is
buying a good from an agent which has the opportunity of making a cost-reducing unobservable investment
prior to the contracting stage. Because of a hold-up problem, the agent will randomizes on his investment
level. This forces the principal to spend informational “rents” to achieve screening. In equilibrium, these
“rents” match the investment costs and the resulting contract yields a price schedule such that the marginal
revenue of the agent equals his long run marginal cost curve. Since the agent’s “type” is an endogenously
determined characteristic, I argue that informational “rents” should be interpreted as quasi-rents that stand
as a payment factor for investment.
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11. Introduction
Consider a ﬁrm that must sink an investment in order to produce a good. The proﬁtability of such a venture
depends on whether the ﬁrm expects or not to recover its sunk costs from future sales. Once the investment
is sunk, the ﬁrm is exposed to the risk that its clients reduce their demand or the price they are willing to pay.
Even if the good is very valuable, it may still be advantageous for the clients to never pay the ﬁrm more than
its variable costs. When the good and the investment are speciﬁc to a client, and have a lesser intrinsic value
outside the relationship, the ﬁrm has little option but to accept such a proposal. There is then less incentive
for the ﬁrm to invest in the ﬁrst place and the social beneﬁts of investment may be lost.
This is an illustration of Williamson’s (1983) classic “hold-up” problem. There are two sets of cir-
cumstances when the hold up problem can generally be solved; vertical integration and commitment with
binding contracts. If the client and the ﬁrm vertically integrate, the issue of who shall absorb the investment
costs becomes economically irrelevant. But vertical integration is often an unrealistic option. It creates
problems of its own by substituting internal management of resources, which can be subject to costly moral
hazard effects, for market transactions. Hence, the general analysis of investment usually implicitly assumes
that binding contracts are possible. With such contracts, the ﬁrm’s clients or possibly some institutions like
banks, can commit themselves to buy today the ﬁrm’s future production at a price that internalizes invest-
ment costs.
Efﬁcient investment can then be achieved under various assumptions about the information structure
(Rogerson, 1992). Yet, in many cases, such contracts are unmanageable. For instance, with respect to
international business transactions, it may prove difﬁcult or even impossible for a local ﬁrm to efﬁciently sue
a foreign ﬁrm for a breach of contract (Thomas and Worrall, 1994; Choi and Esfahani, 1998). Firms doing
business with the government may reasonably doubt that the return they expect from some speciﬁc long-
term project will effectively be paid fully in the future, under all circumstances, because of the government’s
sensitivity to public opinion and its ability to change the law (Vickers, 1993). In other cases, the client may
not even be identiﬁed at the investment stage (consider the development of a new product). Even when
binding contracts are effective, enforcing them usually involves the judiciary system and that can have a
very costly and unpredictable outcome. For instance, if the “speciﬁc” good involved is a common good of a
“speciﬁc” quality that can be observed by the ﬁrm and its client but not by the courts. The ﬁrm would still
be able to obtain a reduced price from the market but would lose the speciﬁc value added in quality.
2One way of looking at the hold-up problem is to point out the wedge between the sharing rules that are
used to distribute investment costs ex ante and investment returns ex post. Another approach to mitigate
the problem is then to identify speciﬁc bargaining subgames whose outcomes reduce that wedge. Tirole
(1986) pionneered this route by showing that investment incentives could be increased under asymmetric
information because the ex post sharing rule that results from a bargaining subgame is generally sensible to
the information structure.
In this paper, I highlight the fact that the privacy of the investment decision provides the party who
makes that investment with a sufﬁcient strategic advantage to protect the return on investment from a hold-
up. There is a principal who wants her agent to invest in a costly technology in order to reduce the variable
cost of producing some good. The principal is limited to short-term contracts and cannot sign a binding
contract prior to the investment stage. Under perfect information, the agent would invest too little because
of the hold up problem: he would justiﬁably fear that the principal would refuse to pay for the investment
cost at the contracting stage. But if the agent invests privately and if that piece of information is valuable to
the principal, then the principal will be willing to yield informational rents to the agent, through a screening
mechanism. These rents, in turn, will indirectly ﬁnance investment. My model can be interpreted as a
classical principal-agent model (Guesnerie and Laffont 1984) to which I add an initial investment stage
wherethe agent has theopportunity ofchoosing his “type”, ataprice (the costof investment). Inequilibrium,
the agent randomizes on his investment support thus inducing a common-knowledge “type” distribution
that is the basis of the subsequent play.
1 Being “tough” with the agent is an option for the principal only
when he has good knowledge of the ﬁrm’s cost structure. Without this knowledge, she runs the risk of
making an unacceptable offer to the agent that can jeopardize the ex post realization of the gains from trade.
An unobserved mixed strategy allows the agent to “hide” his investment behind a veil of endogenously
created noise. An uninformed principal then has a weaker bargaining position which might reduce the ex
ante incidence of the hold-up problem. In Tirole’s model, the principal’s reply to this randomization is to
increase the probability of disagreement ex post. My approach extends Tirole’s analysis to the case where
the principal can use the production level as an instrument to screen the agent at the contracting stage. In
equilibrium, the parties always reach an agreement. When the possibility of renegotiating the contract is
added, screening becomes impossible and the probability of disagreement increases.
3The equilibrium contract I obtain has a deceptively simple structure: it amounts to paying the agent a
nonlinear price such that his marginal revenue curve is equal to his long run marginal cost curve (LRMC).
Contrary to most models of asymmetric information cast in a Bayesian framework, the distribution of
“types” is endogenous in my model (the outcome of an equilibrium mixed strategy) so that observable
variables like production and contracts (“prices”) are functions only of taste and technological parameters
like in classical economics.
Laffont and Tirole (1993) have proposed an explanation of the hold-up problem under asymmetric in-
formation that does not involve a mixed strategy for investment. In their model, investment affects the
distribution of variable costs but not their support. Since variable costs depend on an exogenous random
variable, the principal will try to screen the agent ex post. But they make the implicit assumption that
it is not possible to contract after investment has taken place but prior costs are realized. One can show
(González, 1997) in that context that it is always optimal for the principal to screen agents with respect to
their ex post variable costs but to pool them with respect to their investment level. Since the agent’s pay-
off function is strictly concave in investment and all investment levels are treated equally (pooled) by the
principal, the agent will then play a pure strategy by choosing the unique maximizer on his investment set.
In a recent paper, Gul (1997) analyzes a model of bargaining between a seller and a buyer in an environ-
ment very similar to the one presented here. In Gul’s paper, the buyer has the opportunity ex ante to make
an investment that increases the gains from trade ex post. By allowing the investment to be made privately
by the buyer and by considering a sequential bargaining subgame of offers and counter-offers, Gul comes
to a surprising conclusion. Not only does the unobservability create a need for the seller to screen the buyer
using time as an instrument, but the outcome of the whole game will come arbitrarily close to efﬁciency as
the delay between offers goes to zero even if the seller gathers all the surplus. In my model, the principal will
also screen the agent because of the equilibrium induced randomized strategy and will gather all the surplus
realized in the relationship, but I do fall short of efﬁciency. Not only does the agent invest suboptimally but
he generally chooses an inefﬁcient level of production given his investment.
In Bayesian models, where the distribution of types is exogenous, unobservability of the agent char-
acteristics usually diminishes social welfare as parties engage in wasteful rent-seeking behavior. When the
distribution is endogenous, unobservability actually prevents the distribution of types to collapse on the least
efﬁcient type – an even worse outcome – so that unobservablity actually helps to maintain social welfare.
4The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The model is presented in the next section and solved in
section 3. Three analytical examples are proposed in section 4 to illustrate the links between the agent’s cost
function and his equilibrium mixed strategy. In section 5, I adress the welfare implications of the unobserv-
ability of investment. In section 6, I add the possibility of renegotiation. The last section concludes with a
discussion about the empirical predictive power of principal-agent models based on incomplete information
games vs thoses, like the one in this paper, that rely on games of complete but imperfect information.
2. The model
Consider a two-period relationship between two risk-neutral players. There is a ﬁrm (hereafter, the agent)







) on the market and a potential client (the
principal) with linear preferences. I assume that the ﬁrm can produce two varieties of the good, one being





P be the quantities produced by the ﬁrm for the market and the principal where
q
P is
composed only of the variety preferred by the principal. Both varieties would be perceived as identical on
the market and would sell at price
p
<
1but the principal values each unit of
q
M at
p and each unit of
q
P at
one. I assume that there is little if no chance that the principal could procure himself at price
p through the
market the good of the speciﬁc variety he values the most.
2
I assume that there are limited economies of scope in using the ﬁrm’s installed capacity for a joint













To reduce production costs, the agent has the opportunity of making an investment
e
￿
0. The cost of














































































q so that investment reduces variable costs at a decreasing rate.





0which says that investment decreases marginal cost at













0. The ﬁrst one insures that the second order conditions for the principal’s program are always
satisﬁed while the second one allows us to disregard stochastic contracting schemes.
5The game. The principal observes neither investment nor costs, but is aware of the production set of the
agent; that is, he knows
c. I also assume that he cannot sign binding contracts prior to the investment stage
and that it is common knowledge that he holds all of the bargaining power during the entire game.
Because both varieties of the good have a market value, there always exists an incentive for the agent to
invest. Nevertheless, efﬁciency requires that the agent deals with the principal who has a higher valuation
than the market for a speciﬁc variety that is a perfect substitute in output to the common variety. If the
agent expects a fair deal with the principal to be difﬁcult, he might focus his attention only on the market
and invest suboptimally. The problem is then to provide the agent with incentives to invest optimally. More
precisely, I want to show to what extent the unobservability of investment does provide such incentives.
The course of events is as follows: in the ﬁrst period, the agent privately invests
e.O n c e
e has been sunk,
the agent is said to be of “type”
e and both players enter the second stage
4 where they must agree, through
some bargaining subgame, on an allocation that includes a production plan
q
2
Q and a monetary transfer
t
2
T from the principal to the agent (the sets
Q and
T are non negative values of
q and the real line for
T).
The precise bargaining subgame that is played at that stage is of crucial importance in determining the
equilibrium of the entire game and, in particular, the investment strategy that will be played by the agent.
For instance, if the agent expects that he will be able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the principal at
the second stage, it is easy to see that he will undertake the socially optimal amount of investment and that
he will offer to produce the socially optimal level of the good for a transfer that will cover both ﬁxed and
variable costs and all the gains from trade.
In that case, the player that invests reaps all the ex post gains from trade and will thus optimally equalize
the marginal cost of investment to its marginal return on these gains when making ex ante his investment
decision. A hold-up problem occurs when the bargaining procedure does not share the ex post gains from
trade commensurately to the ex ante investment costs that have to be born by the players.
The bargaining subgame beginning in the second stage is an integral part of the game and cannot con-
ceptually be modelled as an endogenous choice.
5 Hence, the ex post bargaining procedure is given exo-
geneously here by way of the class of contracts that the principal can offer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Nevertheless, the agent always has the external opportunity to use his capacity to sell on the competitive
market at price
p.A s
p is increased, the speciﬁc gains from trade that can be realized with the principal are
decreased and the option value for the agent of going to the market is increased. Hence,
p can be viewed as
a measure of the incidence of the hold-up problem in this economy.
6
6Strategies and payoffs. A pure strategy for the principal is an offer of a contract
￿ (to be deﬁned later) at
the bargaining stage. Since investment costs are sunk at this stage, only variable costs matter to the agent in
this subgame. If the agent refuses the contract proposed by the principal, the game ends: the principal pays
nothing and receives nothing.
7 The agent can use all of his capacity to produce and sell on the market at
price


























to the agent. For all given
p
￿
0, this is a well deﬁned strictly concave function of
e. Furthermore, since





















) is the efﬁcient level of
production that equates marginal beneﬁt
b (either
p or 1) to marginal cost
c
q given investment level
e.T o






















































































) is the traditionnal long
run cost curve of the ﬁrm. Finally, when
e and










































gbe the solution to the r.h.s. of (4). Existence and uniqueness of these values is insured
by the global convexity of the program. I assume that for all
p
>
0 , (4) with
b
=
p has an interior solution.
It follows that we have an interior solution in
b
=












































7Without loss of generality, we can assume that the principal will never propose to pay more than an
average price of 1 per unit of the good produced by the agent. It follows that the agent cannot expect to








e. Since the agent can forego the expected relationship with the



























Suppose now that the agent has invested privately and consider the subgame that begins in the second
stage when the principal, holding all the bargaining power, negociates a contract with the unidentiﬁed agent.
Let
~
F be the Bayesian prior of the principal about the level of investment made by the agent over
E.B yt h e
Revelation principle, the equilibrium outcome of any Bayesian rational communication subgame played by
the principal and the agent can be reached by the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a direct mechanism that satisﬁes
individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC).
Formally, one should deﬁne a contract
￿ as a mapping from the “type” (message) space
E into the










mixed strategy can then be deﬁned as a randomization into this space. I restrict the scope of the analysis by
constructing an equilibrium where the principal plays a pure strategy in the contract space.
8 These contracts

































) after having sent a message















Following the offer made by the principal, the agent either accepts or refuses. In both cases, he may
proceed to the market where he can sell at will at unit price
p. Once the contract negociation has been
settled and once the agent has completed the booking of orders on the market, production and exchange take
place. Since refusing the contract and going to the market can be replicated with a contract that speciﬁes
zero production and no transfer, any agent that has invested
e would behave rationally by accepting any

















































) is the “rent” gathered by an agent of type









9 This formulation encompasses the case where the agent accepts the principal’s contract
but still wishes to sell the output of his remaining capacity on the competitive market.
8The agent accepts any self-selecting contract that satisﬁes (IR) given his type
e. For these contracts, the































































)), he will choose to be active on the
market. By doing so, the agent will equalize his marginal rate of substitution MRS between
q and money
to
p; it follows that the MRS is constant for these types and the sorting condition (that the MRS does not
decrease with












), the solution in the r.h.s. of (IC) is zero and the

























) is non-decreasing. Because the agent’s payoff function
is quasi-linear, the sorting condition is also sufﬁcient to insure global IC. It follows that the local approach






































































In the second regime, the agent is left with no excess capacity for the market; accordingly, his rent pattern
reﬂects the (variable) cost savings that can be achieved with a better type (adjusted for the fact that his
reservation payoff would be modiﬁed).



















































p ;t h a ti s ,t h e
principal must pay the market price for each unit he buys. Obviously, as the next lemma shows, that regime
is never played as the principal will always prefer that an agent of type



























Proof. Consider ﬁrst the following function








































































s is non-increasing in
￿.













































iﬁcation can only increase the payoff to the principal while keeping the agent’s payoff constant. Clearly, to
disprove the lemma, for some optimal self-selecting contract, this type of modiﬁcation should be impossible.
In other words, it must disrupt the IC constraint (IC) for at least some type
e
0. Yet, for any
e
0, the r.h.s. of




























so that the constraint is actually relaxed, a contradiction. Q.E.D.































for an optimal self-selecting contract.
103. The equilibrium
Even if we assume that the principal plays a pure strategy in a Nash equilibrium, it is easy to see that the
agent will be randomizing over his investment set. To show this, suppose the agent plays a pure strategy
e
2
E in equilibrium. Anticipating this strategy to be
~

















) but will be willing to pay only the market price








) units (the revenue
the agent could get on the market) plus a premium no more than the excess in variable costs needed to

































































































































and the expectation of the principal matches the actual strategy played by the agent. But then, whenever
p
<

























0, and the equilibrium would not hold.
Since, in equilibrium, the agent randomizes on his investment level, the principal will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
try to screen the agent with respect to his variable cost structure using the production level as an instrument.
The easiest way to construct a Nash equilibrium is to check whether a given pair of strategies are best replies
one to another. Following that route, I construct the following equilibrium.



















































































































































E be the actual bounded support of the distribution played by the agent and let
e be
its lower bound (obviously,
e
>
0 since the agent can always produce for the market). Deﬁne a mixed
































F is discontinuous in

























￿ must yield the same expected return. By construction,
e is a
point of increase of
F.
Let
￿ be the contract offered in equilibrium by the principal. The ex post return from
￿ to an agent that
has invested
e i sg i v e nb y( IR) and evolves with
e according to (5).








e we can ﬁnd a point of increase
e (perhaps
e itself) that
is played in equilibrium. By lemma 1, we can assume that the agent will only produce for the principal; it


















































) from the contract, which compensates better types
for the marginal variable cost savings they could appropriate for themselves by lying about their type, and













). This payoff must be non negative otherwise the

















0 otherwise, since rents are non
decreasing with
e, the principal could increase her payoff by augmenting
￿ with a ﬁxed strictly positive



































). For the time being, assume that














f. I compute the optimal contract




￿ (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984).










































































































































































































































































0 is the shadow cost of increasing the rent of agent
e.
The boundary condition at
e
=









































































































































































































that is, the classical efﬁciency-at-the-top result.
I now impose equilibrium conditions to determine the value of
e and to characterize completely the
equilibrium contract. For
F to be played in equilibrium over
E
￿, I need (9) to hold with equality over
E
￿












































) as a function of

































which is positive under our convexity assumptions. Hence, the monotonous condition is satisﬁed in equilib-




) of (16) in (13) yields an ordinary linear differential








































0 . Note that






































0 yields 1, so
F is a cumulative distribution function on
E
￿. Q.E.D.
Given the equilibrium strategy
F for the agent, the contract offered by the principal is the standard
screening contract à la Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) which yields the best possible weighting for the princi-
pal between efﬁciency in production and (ex post) “rent” extraction. Since all pure strategies in the support
of the mixed strategy played by the agent must yield the same payoff, these rents must match the investment
cost of having a more or less ex post efﬁcient type. I shall talk of quasi rents, in the Marshallian sense, since
these rents are nothing more than a minimum fair return on past investment in capital.
The equilibrium contract has a simple and very intuitive structure which is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 with
the traditional envelope representation (Viner, 1952) of short-run average costs (AC) curves.
1
0 It amounts
to paying the agent a marginal price of





) units he agrees to produce, and equating
marginal revenue (MR) to the agent’s long run marginal cost (LRMC) for all additional units. To see this,




). This equation is
the ﬁrst-order condition of program (3) that is related to points on the LRMC and LRAC curves. The average







) and is below his MR curve. With such a scheme, the agent will produce until his ex post (short-run)
marginal cost curve MC
(
e








) is tangent to his LRAC curve; hence, the agent’s chosen production plan is cost efﬁcient. At
that point, the agent’s payoff (average revenue minus average cost times his production level; that is,the sum
of the two darker areas) is equal to his market payoff (the sum of the two lighter areas). Hence, from an














induces him to randomize on that support.
15Since the equilibrium contract guarantees the market payoff to the agent, no hold-up will occur and the












)). It is given by (6) and
manages to equate ex ante marginal opportunity cost of investment and ex post marginal savings on variable
costs. Under full commitment, the optimal contract would equate marginal utility (
1) of the principal to





). That point is both ex ante and ex post efﬁcient. In the absence of

















).I ft h e


















), and to receive a unit price of AR
(
e
). It is easy to see that this contract is ex











) is to be
of type
e so that costs are minimized as the (short-run) average cost curve AC
(
e





















) b u ti ti sc o s te f ﬁ c i e n t .




or if the market is competitive so that the agent’s reservation payoff is achieved at the minimum of his LRAC
















). It follows that, for a given variation in









) always changes more for low levels of production, that is for low
e. In a sense, high levels of
production orders are relatively more anchored to the principal’s valuation of 1 than to the market price.
4. Analytical examples
The shape of the distribution




































) and the agent will









) is reduced as
e is
16increased, we will get almost optimal production most of the time. On the other hand, both ex ante and ex










).O t h e r



























ﬁrst lesser (greater) than
￿
1, then equal to
￿
1 at some interior
~
e, then greater (lesser) than
￿
1 which would





e, the distribution of quantities will
share the same characteristics.
I present below three analytical examples that illustrate the dependence of the distribution
F upon the
cost function





2. For each exam-



















2 . The short-run marginal and average










































































With this speciﬁcation, the parameters
E and



















































































































































). The optimal equilibrium






















































































































1so that the distribution will be skewed toward































2 , the price is set higher
than the long-run breakeven point
1












































9. From (18), we can































z. The tick marks on the abcissa represent the tenth

































6. Theskewness ofthedistribution toward






































































































e.S i n c e





























].T h e c o s t
structure is depicted in ﬁgure 3 where the uniform nature of the randomization is apparent by the equidistant
ticks on the abcissa (
q is also distributed uniformly since it is a linear function of
e).





































































will be skewed to the left. See ﬁgure 4.
5. Welfare consequences
Little mention has been made up to now of the consequences of unobservability on expected welfare. We
know that expected investment will rise but so will the incidence of ex post inefﬁciencies in production.

















). Under imperfect information, the agent randomizes over
E
￿ and will invest












) most of the time.
Since the agent receives a payoff of zero (net of his market payoff) whether the game is played under









) units of variety 1 of the good (the amount he would get under full observability), it
is clear that unobservability can only increase social welfare. This is in sharp constrast with Bayesian games
of incomplete information where unobservability of types diminishes social welfare as players engage in
rent seeking behavior.
This important difference comes from the fact that traditionnal Bayesian models assume that the distri-
bution of types is exogenous so that it is not affected by the observability issue. It follows that going from
unobservable to observable types increases welfare as all inefﬁciencies associated with bargainning under
asymmetric information are resolved. When types are endogenous, observability would cause the type dis-





) at a great cost in social welfare. Unobservability then allows more types to
be played, so much that the presence of more efﬁcient types overcomes the fact that most types will now
produce inefﬁciently.








)) or to the fact that almost efﬁcient investment with almost efﬁcient production is



































). With unobservable investment, the agent randomizes on
E
￿ with


































































































































































































































































































2 and it has at least another zero in the interior of
E
￿.S i n c e
￿ is positive for low values of
e but negative for high values, the overall positive contribution to welfare of unobservability can be traced







3 Consider the contribution to welfare
of a marginal increase in
e under unobservability. As






) each time the agent invests at least






) of the time. On the other hand, an increase in
the support of















) for each of these types in order to
prevent higher types to mimic these types. When
e is low, a little more investment has an important positive
marginal effect (since
e is low) and the negative effect is low since production plans need to be distorted
only a little. When






























In this section, I extend the game of section 3 by allowing the agent to propose a take-it-or-leave-it offer of
renegotiation after he has accepted the initial contract


















￿. To simplify the analysis, I will assume that the market price
is








0. As before, a refusal at the initial contracting stage terminates the relationship but




) is to be implemented. I will refer to this
game as renegotiation conditional on acceptance (RCA).




) is selected, then the agent can renegotiate to any allocation that




) can be costlessly enforced. Assume that the agent
randomizes its investment decision on some subset
E
￿. Given that the initial contract is accepted and that




), it is easy to see that an agent that has invested
e























) which gives the same payoff to the principal
and is thus accepted. In a self-selecting renegotiation-proof contract, the initial contract is not renegotiated










) . Anticipating the outcome of the






















































































￿ is the principal’s payoff in that game when a contract is accepted and carried out. I expect a contract





















































that is, whenever the payoff


















)are to be paid anyway. I then obtain the following proposition.
21Proposition 2. In the RCA game, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. There exists a Nash equilib-
























































































































). In equilibrium, both players enjoy the same payoffs that they
would have had investment been observable.




















































). Because of assump-
tion (2), the agent never invests more than























]. Given any such contract
￿
￿, the agent’s ex ante payoff

























) . Depending on






























































































g. No pure strategy equilibrium will exist as
e
=
0 is a strictly best response
































which is a s.b.r. to
e
=


























). Given these numbers, the players must
be indifferent over their best response strategies. This yields the same expected payoffs for the agent and



































































































and these equations solve for
F and




) that could be created
under full observability and the agent gets none of it (with a market price of zero as an option). Q.E.D.
22Although the nature of the mixed strategies is different, the fact that unobservability has no effect on
welfare in proposition 2 is related to proposition 1 in Gul (1997). The possibility of renegotiation destroys
the power of incentive contracts. Without these contracts, simple bargaining subgames are not sufﬁcient to
provide enough incentives for expected welfare-enhancing investment to take place.
7. Conclusion
My results apply generally to Bayesian principal-agent models with adverse selection. In these models,
transfers are decomposed into “costs” that remunerate factors of production and “informational rents” that
are left to the agent as an incitative to make him reveal his type. Here, I challenge this interpretation by
ackowledging that an agent’s “type” is most likely to be the result of an ex ante maximizing choice. Hence,
we should not talk of “informational rents” but of quasi-rents. This interpretation is important both on
normative and positive grounds. From a normative point of view, the mechanism design strategy followed
here is robust to the endogenous formation of types and requires only a good knowledge of cost functions
to be implemented as a practical compensenting scheme.
From a positive point of view, Bayesian models have very little predictive power since the contracts
they predict are supposed to be functions of an elusive (at least for the econometrician) “type” distribution.
One can express doubts concerning the coherence of the assumption that types are unobservable with the
assumption of a common knowledge distribution of types. The resolution of this paradox is to be found
in Harsanyi’s (1967) classical exposition of incomplete information model where the “type” distribution
emerges as the result of some thought equilibrium process that resolves the discrepancies between the play-
ers’ various beliefs. In a sense, the approach followed in this paper substitutes that process with what can
rationally be expected given factor prices on the market and the available technology. Since the contracts
described in this paper depend only on market data, the theory should have more predictive power.
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25Notes
1See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for an application of this technique in a moral hazard problem.
2In what follows, the principal is given all the bargaining power so that her participation constraint is
never binding. What matters is that the agent cannot expect to ﬁnd a customer, other than the principal,
ready to pay a price higher than
p for his production of the speciﬁc variety.
3Suscripts denote partial derivatives for functions with more than one argument. For functions with a
single argument, the prime notation will be used.
4The interim stage in the terminology of Holmström and Myerson (1983); that is, when the agent knows
his type.
5One could think of a game where parties choose together initially to play a particular bargaining sub-
game at the interim stage, but that would amount to assuming that commitment is possible.
6The severity of the hold-up problem increases as
p decreases. Note that if full enforcement contracts
were available at the investment stage, efﬁciency would required that all trade be conducted with the princi-
pal. Hence, interestingly, the ﬁrst best benchmark is unaffected by
p.
7Since the principal has linear preferences, there are no wealth effects and the principal purchases on the
market will not depend on whether he contracted successfully or not with the agent.
8Under my convexity assumptions, one can show that stochastic contracts are dominated by non stochas-






















0This ﬁgure matches the second analytical example discussed below.
1
1Consider the cost-minimizing investment level for production level










2 whenever the value is positive and, as











































































































































































































3This heuristic argument, based on the function
￿, and what follows in the rest of the paragraph,










































q*(1) ^ q(e*(p),1) q(e) q*(p)
1
p














1.61 1.8 1.98 2.14 2.29 2.42 2.55 2.67 2.79 2.9 3
q















0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
q














0.125 0.1965 0.2702 0.3831 0.468 0.5965 1
q
Figure 4: The equilibrium contract of example 3.
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